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Žrtve kriminaliteta i rata: međunarodni i domaći kontekst
Victims,­civil­society­and­transitional­justice­­
in­Bosnia­and­Herzegovina
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T
he role of victim organizations in the transitional justice process is examined in post-
war Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). These organizations emerged in the context 
of the top-down accountability agenda driven by the international crisis intervention 
in the Balkan wars and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). By contrast, in Latin America victim organizations emerged as a self-conscious 
movements of individuals galvanized by their traumatic experience of state repression and 
demanding accountability from the bottom-up. In BiH accountability became a condition 
for re-establishing state political and legal authority but also international financing for 
reconstruction and progress towards EU accession. Victim organizations were part of the 
NGO sector which grew rapidly in response to the neoliberal governance model of self-
organizing civil society to transform post-socialist and postwar BiH. Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), run largely by professional middle class displaced from careers in the 
downsized state bureaucracy, became intermediaries between external donors and war 
affected populations. Victim organizations participated in the transitional justice process 
by supporting victims/witnesses in international and national prosecutions, tracing 
the missing persons and supporting the right of return of displaced populations. In BiH, 
victims’ organizations did not emerge as social movements advocating for citizenship and 
social justice, but became incorporated in the neoliberal governance model, sponsored by 
international agendas for stabilization, democratization and EU accession.
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The wars in the Former Yugoslavia between 1992-1995 changed the 
perception of war and its victims from a humanitarian crisis to a human rights 
crisis.  The shift in the construction of war to a human rights crisis represented 
the first major expansion of the ‘legalization of the international sphere’ after 
the end of the Cold War (Schoenfeld, Levi, Hagan, 2007: 37). The victims of 
these wars became the focus not just of international humanitarian relief, but 
international intervention to prevent further human rights violations. The 
international impact of large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’ saw human rights prevail 
over political diplomacy in the Dayton Peace negotiations. The new human 
rights priority made accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). But accountability went beyond past crimes, it now included human 
rights protection. The new states had to cooperate in the prosecution of 
indictees by arresting them and extraditing them to the Hague but also 
to recognize the rights of victims such as the families of the missing and 
those displaced by war. Accountability in this broader sense was also made 
a condition for the new states that emerged from the former Yugoslavia to 
receive reconstruction assistance, financial and political support for reform 
and progress towards EU accession. 
With the suffering victim as its focus, international criminal law expanded 
to become a form of international crisis management to alleviate suffering 
through holding those responsible accountable before the law (Humphrey, 
2011). The victim was turned into a global citizen through global witnessing 
of  their  suffering  and  through  the  advocacy  of  human  rights  activists 
and families of victims. The use of the term ‘victim’ refers to the analytical 
construct, the subject position of the victim of human rights violation and 
the  fulcrum  around  violence  changes  polarity  from  harming  to  healing 
(Humphrey, 2002). In transitional justice the victim has become a moral, 
legal and political focus for identifying injury, prosecuting those responsible, 
promoting  reconciliation  and  providing  protection.  Ironically,  while  the 
universalizing discourses of human rights and trauma are inclusive on the 
basis of our shared humanity and our shared experience of having a sentient 
body, the victim becomes the fulcrum for selectivity and exclusivity. Only 
those victims considered to be morally deserving have their human rights 
protected (Humphrey, 2010). 
The victim has been instrumentalized in the project of transitional justice, 
constructed as a bridge between the political cruelty and suffering of the Temida
61
past and the future based on human rights. However the ‘victim’ is a complex 
construction.  Human  rights  constitute  the  victim  as  a  subject  position 
(perpetrator v. victim), psychology creates the victim as the bearer of traces 
of violence (trauma), and politics creates the victim as a moral focus for social 
solidarity. Justice and reconciliation increasingly focus on the well-being of 
the victim – materially, bodily, psychologically and socially – i.e. reparations, 
health, inclusive citizenship.
The empirical focus of this paper is the role of war victims in transitional 
justice in postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), where the accountability 
agenda,  defined  broadly  as  prosecution  for  serious  political  crimes  and 
human rights protection, has dominated something very distinctive, and 
insufficiently recognized, about transitional justice in BiH. It examines how 
the rights of victims have been realized through a top-down accountability 
agenda driven by international intervention in the Balkans wars, the ICTY 
prosecutions in The Hague and human rights protection in postwar BiH. The 
study focuses on two categories of victims, ‘the families of the missing’ and 
‘displaced populations’ and the way the ‘right to know the fate of missing 
family members’ and the ‘right of return’ have been addressed in BiH. The 
research is based on fieldwork conducted in BiH in September-October 2010, 
in which interviews were conducted with 20 non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and a variety of professionals working in the broad field of transitional 
justice. The NGOs included international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs) and victim organisations (VOs). This 
nomenclature of organisations reflects the classifications produced under the 
international legal bureaucratic governance in BiH, distinguishing between 
internal and external and local, national and international organisations. The 
paper also draws on the extensive academic research, diverse surveys, reports 
from NGOs and international agencies on the experience of national and 
international justice, the role of civil society organizations and the issue of 
rights protection in BiH.  
The  analytical  perspective  is  comparative,  contrasting  BiH  with  the 
transitional  justice  experience  in  Latin  America.  In  the  post-dictatorship 
democracies amnesty prevailed and human rights became the discourse 
of victim organisations who became mobilized with the aim of overturning 
amnesty laws through public protest, regional cooperation and transnational 
legal strategies, including the use of the Inter American Commission for 
Human Rights and the support for prosecutions under international law Michael Humphrey
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in  Spain,  Belgium  and  Italy.  By  contrast  victim  organizations  in  BiH  did 
not emerge as bottom-up human rights movements mobilized by their 
shared experience of state repression and demands for ‘truth’ and ‘justice’   
(Humphrey , Valverde, 2007).  As everywhere, victims in BiH were socially 
constituted by their shared experience of violence, trauma and loss, but they 
became instrumentalized by the top-down organizations of civil society, 
mobilized as part of the internationally supervised project of social and 
political  transformation  through  rule  of  law,  democratization,  institution 
building and the strengthening of civil society.  The space of civil society was 
constructed as the domain for instituting neoliberal governmentality, based 
on self management and self responsibility organized by a market model of 
competition for grants to support NGO activities.
The challenges of transitional justice in BiH, and the justification of the 
extent of the international intervention creating BiH as a virtual international 
protectorate (Knaus, Martin, 2003) are: the scale of war destruction, the size of 
the rebuilding task and the proportion of the populations directly affected by 
the war through loss of family members, injuries, displacement, loss of homes, 
as well as internal and external exile. The emphasis on accountability points to 
another dimension of transitional justice in BiH, the judicialisation of politics 
and the resort to justice to achieve the broader transitional justice goals of 
national unity, rule of law and inclusive citizenship. A recent report of the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Delivering Justice 
in BiH: An Overview of War Crimes Processing from 2005 to 2010, highlights the 
daunting task of the accountability route for BiH courts. It notes the lack of 
resources, the undetermined size of the caseload and the fact that task of 
determining ‘the level of gravity of cases, level of responsibility of accused, 
quality  of  case  investigation,  potential  availability  of  suspects,  nexus  to 
prosecution priorities etc. has not taken place’ (OSCE Report, 2011: 24).  The 
shortcomings of justice are even more acute in particular areas such as the 
prosecution of rape in war where only 12 cases have been prosecuted out of a 
possible 50,000 to 60,000 cases of wartime rape (Arslanagić, 2012).
Internationally, the transitional justice project has had ambitious goals, 
going beyond mere justice before the courts to include large-scale political 
reform  and  social  healing.  Transitional  justice  has  involved  a  pragmatic 
assessment of how far justice can be pursued under the prevailing political 
conditions. The expansive use of the term ‘reconciliation’ captures the extra-
judicial scope of the transitional justice project: ‘firstly, wrongs arising from Temida
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violence  must  be  identified,  secondly,  a  public  recognition  of  suffering 
should be made, and thirdly, attempts to redress the harm resulting from 
violence should be made’ (Djokić, 2002: 129).  In BiH the legal mechanisms 
for accountability for past political crimes were externally imposed and were 
an integral part of the extensive programme of international intervention 
to bring peace, reconstruct war-damaged cities, rebuild state institutions, 
promote reconciliation and promote EU accession as a strategy of post-
socialist  transformation.  Victim  organizations  became  a  focal  point  of 
intervention to support their participation as witnesses/victims at the ICTY, to 
provide documentation to support families of victims of the missing and help 
trace the missing, to certify victims status and their entitlement to welfare 
and reparation payments, to support specific victims (women), to support the 
process of return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to their 
homes and to promote local reconciliation.
Transitional  justice  in  BiH  can  be  differentiated  into  two  phases, 
corresponding to the shift from the ‘protectorate’ phase, dominated by the 
Office of the High Representative, to a focus on making BiH state institutions 
and NGOs more engaged and responsible for justice and reconciliation. 
The  emphasis  on  strengthening  BiH  institutions  and  accountability  also 
relates to the process of EU accession and compliance. In fact, the use of the 
‘transitional justice’ discourse has really only emerged in the second phase, 
in the context of emphasis on repatriating justice and reconciliation. Hence 
the Humanitarian Law Centre Transitional Justice in Post-Yugoslav Countries 
Report notes the repatriation of war crimes trials to BiH, but in other areas, 
such as compensation and memorials were made for the benefit of majority 
groups (HLC, 2007). The transitional justice lens has gained prominence in BiH 
through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Transitional 
Justice Guide book in BiH (UNDP, 2009a, 2009b) and UNDP Facing the Past 
and Access to Justice project (UNDP , 201 1). Recent scrutiny of the war-related 
payments system for veterans and civilians run by each Entity has introduced 
a transitional justice lens to clarify the nature of payments as welfare or 
reparation, as well as review the financial sustainability of these payments 
(Popić, Panjeta, 2010).Michael Humphrey
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NGOs­and­transitional­justice
The  transitional  justice  project  in  postwar  BiH  is  just  one  dimension 
of a top-down down interventionist legal-bureaucratic project of postwar 
reconstruction, state-building and reconciliation. While, on the one hand, 
international intervention sought to re-establish the central political and legal 
authority of the state, on the other hand the legal-bureaucratic project also 
supported the rapid expansion of NGOs growing from only a handful during 
the war to around 1500 a decade later, as an essential element for successful 
state  building  (Evans-Kent,  Bleiker,  2003;  Belloni,  2001).  Their  growth  was 
enabled by the international donors and agencies, who saw NGOs as the most 
cost effective way to deliver services (Evans-Kent, Bleiker, 2003). Hence the top-
down legal-bureaucratic project promoted civil society capacity building, which 
led to the emergence of a NGO sector organized around a market-oriented 
logic  of  competitive  contract  projects  and  reform  the  legal  environment 
regulating NGOs through the internationally led LEA/LINK project (Belloni, 
2007: 114). The main multilateral organizations and pledging states explicitly 
gave preference to NGO projects which promoted neoliberal democratization 
(Evans-Kent, Bleiker, 2003). Hence the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) promoted civil society development, drawing on the Dayton 
Agreement, as the basis for peace and stability (Chandler, 2000). 
Civil society in BiH was constituted by a local NGO sector, but dominated 
by international NGOs and their local affiliates as ‘partnerships’ (Mitchell, 2006: 
394). The agendas and resources of international donors largely determined 
the activities of NGOs and their longevity. Far from being independent and 
organic expressions of social mobilization and responsibility, one of their 
alleged strengths, they were financially dependent on external donors. As 
the different phases of reconstruction, development and nation-building 
proceeded, NGOs could only survive by acquiring the neoliberal attributes 
of flexibility, self-responsibility and entrepreneurialism to survive. They were 
forced to reinvent themselves and forge new roles and new relationships, in 
order to compete for grants with increasingly shorter-term contracts. In other 
words, transitional justice reached beyond state institutions and became 
concerned with the organization of society itself.
Civil society is often juxtaposed to the state.  It is used as ’a catch all 
term for everything below the state‘, or defined as in ‘opposition to the 
state’ (Hearn, 2001: 340). It is also seen as an antidote to the state and seen to Temida
65
embody an ethical idea of social order on the basis of voluntary and private 
arrangements (Hearn, 2001).  In BiH, the international community viewed local 
NGOs as counterweights to entrenched political elites and nationalist parties. 
They  set  about  promoting  organized  civil  society  –  i.e.  developing  local 
NGO partners – by targeting the urban professional middle class to play the 
role of intermediaries between the international organizations and national 
institutions and Bosnian society (Chandler, 2000: 140). They saw civil society as 
the locus for the empowerment of individuals, by developing their capacity for 
democracy rather than government’s (Chandler, 2000: 149). The proliferation 
of NGOs in postwar BiH was itself an index of structural change, in which the 
new state bureaucracies no longer provided a career path for middle class 
professionals. The NGO sector became the arena of opportunity for the middle 
class, displaced by the dismantling of the welfare/socialist state of Yugoslavia 
first by war and now by the new neoliberal model of governance. Through 
their international connection with international NGOs and donors, the middle 
class professionals also played the role of ‘translating ideas from the global 
arena down and from the local arena up’ (Merry, 2006: 39). 
In the case of transitional justice, the external agenda of justice and 
accountability  through  the  ICTY  dominated  until  2005,  when  increasing 
capacity building in the justice sector coincided with the focus on repatriation 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the BiH legal system – the BiH 
Court, the BiH Office of the Prosecutor and the BiH Ministry of Justice. These 
also coincided with the growing EU focus on transitional justice as a holistic 
strategy between human rights and conflict resolution (Unger, 2010). In fact, 
the term transitional justice was only adopted in BiH human rights and law 
reform policies and programmes after 2005, coinciding with the increasing 
emphasis on local responsibility and capacity. The UNDP programme on 
Transitional  Justice  was  the  most  prominent  and  effective  through  the 
survey on ‘Justice and Truth in BiH: Public Perspectives’ (2005), conferences, 
the Transitional Justices Guidebook for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009) and the 
programme Access to Justice: Facing the Past and Building Confidence for the 
Future (2009-2013). The main aim of these transitional justice projects was ‘to 
inform and support victims of war in their pursuit of justice and individual 
human rights’ (UNDP, 2009a, preface). Even though this transitional justice 
project  seeks  to  develop  local  capacity  working  through  civil  society 
organisations  and  victim  organizations,  it  still  remains  supervised  and Michael Humphrey
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monitored by EU institutions as set out under Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement for Bosnia signed in 2008 (Subotić, 2009: 164)
Victims  in  BiH  were  integrated  into  the  top-down  international 
architecture of policy agendas and conditional funding, that deliberately 
sought to develop civil society as an intermediary space to mediate and 
translate policy. From the end of the war, victims and victim organisations 
played the role of information providers and support for witnesses in court 
hearings. The public perception of civil society organisations and victim 
organisations  in  BiH  is  that  they  have  been  critical  in  the  fight  against 
denial of war crimes and in their documentation (They were part of the 
international selection of partners, which sought to make accountability a 
mode of governance, which sidelined local and national politics in favour of 
international administration.)
Victims­and­Human­Rights­Protection
Civil society organisations overlap between those organized for victims 
and those organized by victims.  But once formally constituted as a NGO 
connected to the network of NGOs, seeking grants for specified projects, 
they became neoliberal actors competing for international development and 
assistance grants to survive like all NGOs. While victim organisations invariably 
formed on the basis of their shared experience of violence or a particular 
event, they became recruited into a top-down transitional justice process 
rather emerge as human rights movements advocating for rights, citizenship 
and social justice. To illustrate the way war victims pursued  human rights 
in postwar BiH, we will turn to case studies of ‘the families of the missing’ 
and ‘the returnees’. I will consider the role of the International Commission 
on Missing Persons in organizing families of the missing to advocate for their 
rights and trace the missing, and the role of Reconstruction and Returns Task 
Force (RRTF) as an agent in the recovery of ‘multiethnic society‘ through 
enforcing the right of return. Temida
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Missing Persons in BiH
The question of ‘missing persons’ has been a major issue in transitional 
justice in BiH as a crime against humanity and the right of family members 
to know the fate of their missing members and for reparation under the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (2006).  The scale of the missing produced by ethnic cleansing 
in BiH the issue of the missing became the subject of a UN Special Process 
as early as 1994. Since then the ‘the missing’ have become the focus of a 
complex network of international initiatives seeking to improve tracing, speed 
up identification of remains and address the rights and needs of the families 
with missing members (Novak, 1998). However the coordination of the variety 
of international actors investigating missing persons, being able to secure 
cooperation of the Entities to investigate mass graves and organize families as 
advocates for their rights has been a major challenge. 
In 1996 the US government established the International Commission 
of  Missing  Persons  (ICMP)  to  support  investigation  into  the  missing 
internationally. In BiH ICMP became one of the most prominent international 
NGOs tracing the missing alongside the ICRC. The priority of ICMP office in 
BiH priorities was to put ‘political pressure on all parties concerned, support 
families  and  survivors,  and  financial  assistance  to  assistance  to  forensic 
activities … aimed at bringing a solution to the problem of missing persons’ 
(Novak, 1998: 113). In 2000 the ICMP established the Missing Persons Institute 
(MPI) to help overcome the problems of working across the entities. They 
sought to improve national coordination in tracing the missing in BiH and 
in 2003 invited the BiH Council of Ministers to become a co-founder of the 
MPI  creating  a  joint  international  NGO  and  governmental  institution.  Its 
goal was to overcome Entity divisions and establish a sustainable national 
mechanism to investigate missing persons irrespective of gender, ethnic 
or religious background. In addition, the ICMP promoted a Law on Missing 
Persons designed to improve the tracing process, establish a Central Records 
office and realize the rights of family members and missing persons. While the 
Law was legislated in 2004, obstacles such as the failure to establish a Central 
Records database of missing persons and disagreement on financing the 
Fund for Support to Families of Missing Persons Associations has so far made 
the Law ineffective. The Law represents the only state based law with the Michael Humphrey
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provision for compensation of families of victims but it has not been allocated 
a budget (Popić, Panjeta, 2010).
As  well  as  reinforcing  national  level  human  rights  bodies  the  ICMP 
supported associations of family members as civil society organizations to 
advocate  for  their  rights  through  small  grants,  support  surviving  family 
members, build their capacity and provide training workshops to become 
self-reliant through grant writing and making applications. They engaged 
family associations through funding small project and organized conferences 
and workshops to address current concerns and planning. They also sought 
to  make  them  more  effective  by  cooperation  and  networks  between 
associations.  For  example,  these  provided  a  forum  to  confront  difficult 
dilemmas such as the technical, legal and emotional questions about closing 
cases raised by co-mingled and disarticulated mortal remains recovered from 
multiple mass graves. However in the context of the changing international 
priorities for NGO support in BiH the ICMP is changing its relationship to 
the associations of families. Its latest strategy is to encourage greater self-
sufficiency through the ‘civil society initiatives programme’ which has four 
primary  goals  –  building  self-sustainability  of  associations  of  families  of 
missing persons; developing effective coordination structures; supporting 
projects connected to transitional justice and dealing with the past; and 
promoting education and awareness of rights (ICMP, 2012). At the same time 
the ICMP, through its forensic capacity and links to family associations, has 
supported international and national courts in the prosecution of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide.
The attempt to strengthen central state institutions through the MPI and 
the Law on Missing Persons, while apparently constructive and designed to 
achieve the objective of identifying the missing, informing families about 
the fate of their missing members and contributing to investigations and 
prosecution confronts the politicized reality of transitional justice in BiH. 
Transitional justice has been channeled by the straight jacket of the divided 
entities and the ethno-nationalist perspectives they hold onto. So when 
family associations accept money from political parties they become vehicles 
for ethno-nationalist parties to promote their particular versions of statehood 
(Subotić, 2009: 163). Thus from the perspective of ethno-nationalist politicians 
in Republika Srpska the ICMP advocacy for the MPI was to strengthen the 
central state and delegitimize the Bosnian Serb entity.Temida
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Returnees
The displaced became highly symbolic in the postwar reconstruction 
and reconciliation project. The war project of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in BiH had 
produced an estimated 250,000 dead and displaced more than half the 4.4 
million from their homes of which over 1 million ended up as refugees outside 
the country (Ó Tuathail, Dahlman, 2005). Through the Dayton Agreement the 
international community made the right of return an important mechanism 
to reverse the gains of ethnic cleansing, to affirm the rights of victims of 
displacement and contribute to the re-establishment of rule of law and the 
authority of central institutions.  Return was seen as a key to ‘sustainable post-
war recovery’ (Jansen, 2006: 180). An international inter-agency body, the 
Reconstruction and Returns Task Force (RRTF), acted as a ‘powerful political 
force with real capacities and sanctioning power in negotiations with ethno-
nationalist run local authorities’ (Ó Tuathail, 2010: 261). In 2002 the RRTF began 
to establish local Municipal Return Commissions which were designed to 
act as a local RRTF body. The ‘right of return’ gave displaced individuals the 
opportunity to reclaim their property and the choice of whether to return. 
However return meant re-entering a radically altered social and political 
landscape where ‘Bosnian places had a majority people; all others were small 
minorities’ (Ó Tuathail, 2010: 262).
Return  invoked  the  logic  of  the  recovery  of  the  past  as  ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ which in fact concealed the extent to which local worlds had 
been transformed by war, the creation of the new BiH state, and neoliberal 
post-socialist  economic  model  promoted  by  international  agencies  and 
programmes. The international community’s model of social and political 
transformation emphasized ‘issues of return and reconciliation built on a non-
military solution for nationalist tensions, through rule of law, including the 
punishment of war crimes and the protection of minority rights, and through 
decentralized administration within the bounds of state sovereignty’ (Jansen, 
2006:  186).    But  displaced  Bosnians  were  often  less  motivated  to  return 
because of attachment to their original homes than with ‘risk-minimization 
and  securing  wellbeing,  including,  crucially,  opportunities  for  the  next 
generation’ (Jansen, 2006: 185). War had already dismantled their old world 
and neoliberal economics only intensified their sense of ‘precariousness.’
In postwar BiH the number of returns were presented by international 
agencies as an index of the success of international intervention – in 2005 Michael Humphrey
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the official figure of over 1 million had returned of the 2.5 million displaced 
(Jansen, 2006). However the figures conceal the actual patterns of relocation 
and extent of social reintegration. Over half returned to internal displacement 
areas in which minorities concentrated (Jansen, 2006). This did not correspond 
with the ideal of local reintegration and in fact only reinforced communities 
as constituencies in nationalist/ethnic politics. The heavy moral, symbolic and 
financial investment by the international community and agencies in return 
had the consequence of reinforcing ethnicized minority identities as opposed 
to citizen. The ‘returnee’ became the focus of complex policies and NGO 
networks supporting reconstruction, microcredit, educational reform and 
employment creation. In addition, the patterns of return were also shaped 
by the source of the war violence in particular places – i.e. experienced as 
internal or external (Ó Tuathill, 2010).
The  returns  policy  linked  local  cooperation  with  the  benefit  of 
reconstruction assistance. This conditionality created a complex problem for 
NGOs involved in reconstruction. They very easily became hostage to the 
goals of postwar local political elites and the rescaling of local geographies 
of power (Ó Tuathail, 2010). Thus local authorities accepted reconstruction 
assistance to consolidate ethnic constituencies in the interests of particular 
parties.    For  opposite  reasons  –  the  desire  to  limit  minority  returns  – 
local authorities could obstruct returns by creating a climate of fear and 
intimidation  through  security  incidents  to  dissuade  potential  returnees 
from seeking reconstruction funds. Official refusal to accept return refugees 
meant dismissal by the OHR. In addition, the market logic of competition 
amongst NGOs for reconstruction assistance resulted in NGOs making deals 
with local authorities in order to secure contracts – e.g. trade-offs to provide 
extra services to succeed (Devine, 2011). Instead of return policy ‘remaking 
home in Bosnia’ (recovery of past peaceful coexistence) it became ‘reduced to 
mere restitution of private property, embedded in a “technical” human rights 
discourse’ (Jansen, 2006: 195).Temida
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Conclusion
In  BiH  transitional  justice  represents  a  crisis  model  of  international 
governance built on the expansion of the role of international criminal law 
and policy harmonization with the EU accession project. Transitional justice 
has been a top-down legal-bureaucratic exercise and closely integrated with 
governance. However transitional justice has remained defined by its legal 
objectives and legal mechanisms and has not been successful in advancing 
reconciliation  because  of  the  failure  to  realize  a  unifying  narrative  of 
statehood in post-Dayton BiH.  Accountability was just one dimension of the 
extensive international intervention which while foregrounding state-building 
and rule of law set out to organize civil society organizations as go-betweens 
as well as instruments of neoliberal governmentality shaped by international 
policy agendas and financial grants.
Except  in  the  broadest  sense  that  all  victims  desire  justice,  victim 
organizations in BiH have not been agenda setting and at the forefront of 
human rights claim making as in post-dictatorship Latin America. With the 
dominance of international NGOs and their affiliated organizations, NGOs have 
been less connected to local governmental organizations than to international 
agendas and funding opportunities (Chandler, 2004). Recent calls by BiH NGOs 
to develop relations with local government represent a crisis in NGO sector in 
sustaining themselves as international funding winds down. 
In postwar BiH civil society can be conceived as a new post-socialist 
space created by international agendas rescaling state sovereignty. While 
the growth of NGOs might be seen as an expression of the vitality of civil 
society and democratic participation in the case of postwar BiH they are 
the product of the contraction of the state and its functions. Professionals 
and civil servants once employed by the socialist/welfare state have been 
displaced into the NGO sector and have to pursue their careers on the terms 
dictated by neoliberal governmentality and become go-betweens of local 
and international donors fulfilling the Dayton Agreement and EU stabilization 
and accession agendas. Jansen (2006) refers to the life condition produced 
by  war  and  reinforced  by  neoliberal  governance  as  ‘precariousness.’  As 
the international intervention and supervision withdraws so too will the 
predicament of NGOs tied to external funding will become more precarious. 
One  of  the  limitations  of  the  top-down  transitional  justice  model 
incorporating NGOs as flexible and self-resilient actors has been the failure to Michael Humphrey
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make victims the fulcrum of an inclusive national postwar narrative. While the 
ICMP and RRTF both sought to promote non-discriminatory rights through 
national institutions to subordinate Entity institutions and ethnically based 
politics the outcomes of tracing the missing and achieving returns tended 
to reinforce differences rather than reconcile them. In this top-down model 
the recognition of victims’ rights create a legal façade of universality while 
in practice reinforce ethnic division, they appear to affirm the success of 
law over politics and become an indice of the relative success of tracing the 
missing and successful returns but have not led to the recovery of national 
society  or  produced  reconciliation.  Transitional  justice  has  been  caught 
between its politicization by ethno-nationalist parties to advance particular 
visions  of  statehood  and,  more  recently,  the  discourse  adopted  by  the 
international community to promote participation and ownership of justice 
and accountability in the process of repatriation of war crimes prosecution 
from the ICTY to BiH.
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Mi c h a e l  hu M P h R e y
Žrtve,­civilno­društvo­i­tranziciona­pravda­u­Bosni­i­Hercegovini
Uloga organizacija žrtava je ispitivana u posleratnoj Bosni i Hercegovini (BiH) 
u okviru procesa tranzicione pravde. Ove organizacije su se pojavile u kontekstu 
agende odgovornosti „odozgo-nadole” koju su pokrenule međunarodna krizna 
intervencija u balkanskim ratovima i Međunarodni krivični sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju 
(ICTY).  Nasuprot  tome  u  Latinskoj  Americi  organizacije  žrtava  su  nastale  kao 
samosvesni  pokreti  pojedinaca  podstaknutih  traumatskim  iskustvima  državne 
represije koji su tražili odgovornost „odozdo-nagore”. U BiH odgovornost je postala 
uslov za ponovno uspostavljanje političkog i pravnog autoriteta države, ali i za 
međunarodno finansiranje vezano za rekonstrukciju i procese približavanja Evropskoj 
uniji. Organizacije žrtava bile su deo NVO sektora koji se brzo razvijao kao odgovor 
na model neoliberalnog upravljanja „samoupravno” organizovanog civilnog društva 
kako bi se transformisala post-komunistička i posleratna BiH. Nevladine organizacije, 
kojima su upravljali uglavnom profesionalci iz srednje klase koji su izgubili posao 
u procesu smanjivanja državne birokratije, postali su posrednici između spoljnih 
donatora i ratom pogođene populacije. Organizacije žrtava učestvovale su u procesu 
tranzicione pravde tako što su podržavale žrtve i svedoke pred međunarodnim i 
domaćim sudovima, tako što su tražili nestale osobe ili podržavali pravo na povratak 
raseljenih lica. U BiH organizacije žrtava nisu iznikle kao socijalni pokreti koji traže 
državljanstvo ili socijalnu pravdu, već su se inkorporirale u model neoliberalnog 
upravljanja,  koji  su  sponzorisale  međunarodne  organizacije  koje  se  zalažu  za 
stabilizaciju, demokratizaciju i prijem BiH u EU. 
Ključne reči: žrtve, tranziciona pravda, civilno društvo, ljudska prava, Bosna i 
Herzegovina.